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he tort "reform" movement of the last two decades has turned the civil justice sys-

tern into a battleground. Founded in 1986, the American Tort Reform Association
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The Changing Landscape
Mark A. Behrens and Cary Silverman
ci- more than a decade, civil justice
iefotm efforts have focused on punitive
damages, products liability, and medical
malpractice liability, among other issues.
Although these traditional efforts are
important and should continue, the frontier
of tort reform reveals new challenges to be
addressed: judicial nullification of state tort
reform legislation, regulation and taxation
through litigation, and an explosion of state
court class actions.
Judicial Nullification
Plaintiffs' bar scholars consider judicial
nullification of state tort reform legislation
one of the most significant occurrences in
tort law from the plaintiffs' perspective in
the past 50 years. Judicial nullification
occurs when state courts use state constitutional provisions to overturn legislative tort
policy decisions. This practice relies on the

growing willingness of some state courts to
substitute their own views of proper tort
law for that of state legislators.
Many of the decisions overturning tort
reform statutes are based on the assumption that state courts have a fundamental
and exclusive right to make state tort law,
which ignores both sound policy considerations and legal history. The decisions
overlook the fact that legislatures are
uniquely situated to reach informed decisions on the need for broad and complex
public policy changes. Also ignored is the
fact that when state legislatures delegated
to state courts the authority to develop the
common law in accordance with the "public policy" of the state, the legislatures also
provided that such authority could be
retrieved.
continued on page 4

.(ARA),with the backing of 300 corporate, professional, and insurance trade organization members, boasts that most states have enacted some form of tort reform-laws
that restrict the rights of injured consumers to sue and be fully compensated for their
injuries.
In the mid-1980s, manufacturers, municipalities, doctors, nurse-midwives, daycare
centers, nonprofit groups, and many other commercial customers of liability insurance
were faced with skyrocketing insurance rates, coverage reductions, and arbitrary policy cancellations. Many could not find coverage at any price.
Insurance companies said costs were being driven up by an "explosion" in litigation
and claimed "frivolous lawsuits" and "out of control" juries were forcing them to make
insurance unaffordable or even unavailable. They told state legislatures around the
country that the only way to ease this crisis was to limit tort laws, to make it more difcontinued on page 6
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By 1985 interest rates had dropped, and investment income had decreased accordingly The
industry responded by sharply increasing premiums and reducing availability of coverage, creating a "liability insurance cisis." As Business Week explained in aJanuary 1987 editonal,

The Insurance Cycle
continuedfrom page 1
ficult for sick and injured consumers to sue and be compensated by wrongdoers in
court.
But what ultimately proved to be the true cause of the "liability insurance crisis" of the
mid- 1980s was not the legal system at all. Study after study that examined the property/casualty insurance industry found the same result: The "insurance crisis" was actually a self-inflicted phenomenon caused by the mismanaged underwriting practices of the industry itself.
The past few years, when the economy for the most part was booming, have found state
court tort filings stable or declining. Only 10 percent of injured people file claims for compensation, and just 2 percent file lawsuits. Nearly eight times as many patients suffer an injury
from negligent medical treatment than ever file a claim. Punitive damages are rarely awarded, and liability insurance costs for businesses are minuscule and dropping. The premiumgouging cash-flow underwriting practices of the insurance industry have been widely
exposed. With these facts in n-md, it may be hard to understand why tort reform remains
on the national agenda.
Without question, one of the major reasons is the number of conservative, industry-sponsored think tanks, polling companies, and lobbying firms that are setting legislative agendas,
devising strategies, and purchasing expensive media to convince the public that the tort system is out of control and needs to be scaled back. Because of the intensity of their efforts, it
is sometimes easy to forget that it was the insurance industry that created the "crises" that led
to the drive for tort reform in the first place. Given recent indications, the insurance cycle is
about to change again.
The insurance industry's profits and underwriting practices are cyclical, often characterized
by sharp ups and downs. In fact, these underwriting practices and the insurance cycle caused
a similar, less severe "insurance crisis" in the mid-1970s. During years of high interest rates
and/or excellent insurer profits, insurance companies engage in fierce competition for premium dollars, lowering prices and insuring very poor risks just to get the premium dollars. In
the mid-1980s, the cycle effects were exacerbated by a particularly exaggerated underwriting
response to the high interest rates of the early 1980s-characterized by such risky underwriting as insuring the MGM Grand Hotel months after it burned down in afire.

Mark Your Calendar
Life Insurance Law, Health and Disability
Insurance Law, Public Regulation of
Insurance Law, Employee Benefits, and
Financial Services Integration Committees
28th Annual CLE Midwinter Meeting,
January 16-19 in Lake Buena Vista, FL
(312.988.5672 or 877.309.1565; e-mail:
aba@trexperts.com)

Bioethics, Minorities and the Law, April
5-6 in Tuskegee, AL (312.988.5672)
TIPS 2002 Spring Meeting, April 11-14,
2002 in Destin, FL (312.988.5672)
2002 National Trial Academy, April 2024 in Reno, NV (312.988.5656)"

Fidelity and Surety Law Committee 2002
Annual CLE Midwinter Meeting, January
25 in New York, NY (312.988.5672)
TIPS Industry Conference: The Marriage
of Insurers and Outside Counsel: Renewal
of Vows or Trial Separation, January 2829 in Chicago, IL (312.988.5672)
ABA Midyear Meeting, February 6-12 in
Philadelphia, PA (312.988.5672)
Section of Dispute Resolution and Tort
and Insurance Practice Section Fourth
Annual Spring Dispute Resolution
Conference--"New Vistas in Dispute
Resolution," April 4-6 in Seattle, WA
(312.988.5672)

16TrSouc *,

Even while the industry was blaming its troubles on the tort system, many experts
pointed out that its problems were largely self-made. In previous years the industry
had slashed prices competitively to the point that it incurred enormous losses. That,
rather than excessive jury awards, explained most of the industry's financial difficulties.
The National Association of Attorneys General and state commissions in New Mexico,
Michigan, and Pernsylvania reached similar conclusions. Even the insurance industry admitted this internally In 1986 Maurice R. Greenberg, president and CEO of American
International Group, Inc., told an insurance audience in Boston that the industrs problems
were due to price cuts taken "to the point of absurdity" in the early 1980s. Had it not been
for these cuts, he said, "there would not be 'all this hullabaloo' about the tort system."
But to the public and to lawmakers, insurers told a different story. In fact, coming out of
their bottom year of 1984, insurance companies marketed the idea that the civil justice system is flawed. The goal, in the words of industry leader John J. Byrne, GEICOs chairman,
was "to withdraw [from the market] and let the pressure for reform build in the courts and
in the state legislatures."
To support this effort, the Insurance Information Institute purchased $6.5 million worth
of print and television ads in 1986. Their headlines read "The Lawsuit Crisis Is Bad for
Babies," "The Lawsuit Crisis Is Penalizing School Sports," and "Even Clergy Can't Escape the
Lawsuit Crisis"; the ads ran in Readers' Digest, Time, Newsweek, and Sunday newspaper supplements. Insurance companies and other insurance trade associations complemented the
campaign with their own ads.
State legislatures, regulators, and voters in ballot initiative states were told by business and
insurance lobbyists (and their PR firms) that the way to bring down insurance rates was to
make it more difficult for injured consumers to sue in court. A November 7, 1988, National
Underwritereditorial entitled "Prepare for the backlash" bluntly conceded, "Lets face it. The
only reason tort reform was granted in many states is because people accepted our argument
that it was needed to control soaring insurance rates." At the same time, another business
trade publication acknowledged "a virtual absence of empirical evidence that tort reform
[would] indeed lower liability insurance rates or expand the insurance availability."
When lobbyists were pushed hard by legislators to provide guarantees that rates would
drop, they could not. In state after state, subsequent rate filings with insurance departments
confirmed this. For example, in 1986 Washaigton State enacted what was considered at the
time one of the most comprehensive tort reform bills ever. Before it passed, Ted E.Linham,
president of the Washington State Physicians Insurance Association, testified that
the new law would reduce premiums charged by the association, a mutual company, by
25 to 30 percent within 18 months after the legislation took effect. However, after the law
passed, the company asked for a rate hike, and state regulators began looldng for an
explanation.
By the late 1980s, the insurance cycle had flattened out; rates stabilized, and availability
improved everywhere. This had nothing to do with tort law restrictions enacted in particular states but was the result of modulations in the insurance cycle everywhere. As
Washingtons insurance commissioner Dick Marquardt concluded in a 1991 report, it was
"impossible to attribute stable insurance rates to tort-law changes or the damages cap" because
rates also improved in states that did not pass tort reform.
This fact was confirmed much later in a 1999 Center for Justice & Democracy study,
Premium Deceit--the Failureof "Tort Reform" to Cut Insurance Prices. After examining liability
insurance rates in every state in the country between 1985 and 1997, the study concluded
that enactment of tort reform had not succeeded in reducing insurance prices for insurance
consumers. Some states that resisted enacting tort reform since 1985 experienced low
increases in insurance rates relative to the national trends, and others that enacted major tort
reform packages saw high rate increases.
After publication of the report, ATRA spokespeople admitted in published statements that
lawmakers who enacted tort reform should not expect insurance rates to drop. ATRA
President Sherman Joyce told Liability Week on July 19, 1999, "We wouldn't tell you or anyone that the reason to pass tort reform would be to reduce insurance rates." Victor Schwartz,
ATRA's general counsel and one of D.C. principal tort reform lobbyists on behalf of business interests, told Business Insurance he thought severe tort reform measures could reduce
insurance rates; when pressed, however, he admitted, "more importantly... many tort reform
advocates do not contend that restricting litigation will lower insurance rates, and I've never
said that in 30 years."
Tort reform has had terrible consequences for many innocent people yet done nothing to
improve the affordability or availability of liability insurance for businesses or professions.
Insurance companies that claim otherwise are severely misleading the country's lawmakers.*
Joanne Doroshow is executive director of the Centerfor Justice & Democracy in New York City.
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